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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------
M. ELAINE BROWN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
Case No. 15,638 
WENDELL V. MILLER, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff sued the defendant on a 
promissory note, and the defendant counterclaimed to 
have the entire transaction set aside and his down 
payment returned to him; 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The Court 
found in favor of the plaintiff on her Complaint and dis-
missed the defendant's Counterclaim, no cause of action, 
from which rulings the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the decisions of the 
Trial Court sustained and the defendant's appeal dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1977, the parties entered into an 
Agreement whereby the defendant agreed to purchase a 
restaurant supply business, then known as L. D.'s Fine 
Foods, from the plaintiff for $7,500.00. 
The defendant, Mr. Miller, paid the sales price b; 
paying to the plaintiff $3, 750. 00 in cash and by executing 
and delivering to the plaintiff a promissory note in the 
amount of $3,750.00. The minor corrections currently 
appearing on the face of the Promissory Note were made sub-
sequent to execution and delivery of the note at the request 
of Mr. Miller and with his consent. 
Thereafter, the defendant made no payments on the 
note and the plaintiff filed her Complaint to recover the 
amount thereof together with attorney's fees and costs. Tr.; 
defendant answered, admitting that he signed and delivered 
the subject promissory note and that he had made no pay-
ments pursuant to the terms thereof; defendant raised the 
affirmative defense of misrepresentation. 
In addition, the defendant counterclaimed, demano·, 
ing judgment in the amount of the initial cash payment of 
$3,750.00 and for a declaration that the subject promissori 
note was null and void, the grounds therefore apparently 
being, duress and lack of consideration. 
At trial, the defendant assumed the responsibiL· 
to go forward. (T-2). 
-2-
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The defendant put forward at trial little or no 
competent evidence on this issue of misrepresentation and 
duress. For example, the defendant admitted twice that 
neither the plaintiff nor any of her representatives made 
any untrue statement with respect to the business with which 
the plaintiff dealt in the Price, Utah area. Similarly, 
the only apparent reference to duress are Mr. Miller's 
statements that a Mr. Chiever, the real estate agent, was 
in a rush to finish up the closing and the the promissory 
note signed so that he (Mr. Chiever) could go to his mother's 
funeral. Consistent therewith, the appellant's brief deals 
only with the defense of lack of consideration, and accordingly, 
the scope of this brief will be restricted to that issue. 
With respect to consideration, the record dis-
closes the following: The plaintiff had developed a business 
called L. D.'s Fine Foods, which operated in the area of 
Price, Utah. The plaintiff had developed a business relation-
ship with approximately 20 businesses in the Price area. Mrs. 
Brown periodically called on each of the businesses where as 
often as possible, she received an order for food products 
and other restaurant supplies. Thereafter, Mrs. Brown would 
purchase the ordered items from local supply houses and 
deliver the same to her customers and receive payment either 
in cash or by a later billing. 
When Mr. Miller agreed to purchase the distribu-
tion business, Mrs. Brown took him with her on her rounds, 
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where she taught him the route and taught him where she 
purchased her supplies and taught him the customary method 
by which she billed her customers. She identified for fu 
Miller all of her customers, she took him into the various 
businesses and introduced him to the managers thereof as 
the new owner of her business, she gave him the name 
L. D. 's Fine Foods, but advised him not to use the name, 
(for which advice he was unhappy) , and, she terminated her 
business relationship with her customers. 
Mr. Miller now operates the business on a part-ti: 
basis and apparently realizes less profit than Mrs. Brownd: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
HAD GIVEN ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION 
TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
The record shows that the respondent transferred· 
to the appellant, as consideration, an on-going and con-
tinuing business, in its entirety. The respondent had 
established a food distribution business called "L. D. 's 
Fine Foods." As part of the sale thereof to the appellant, 
the respondent identified all of her customers (approximat€. 
20 in number) to the appellant, and introduced the appellar! 
to them as owner of the business. The respondent spent 
two days with the appellant taking the appellant to the 
various businesses, introducing him and teaching him t~ 
. ceedures 
route she customarily followed and the various pro 
used in the business. In addition, she introduced the 
-4-
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appellant to a major wholesaler of the business and she gave 
him general advice on operation of the business and use of 
the business name which she also transferred to him. The 
respondent thereafter terminated her business relationship 
with her customers in favor of the appellant. 
The respondent concurs with Point I of the appellant's 
brief which, as applied to this case, is to the effect that 
the respondent must give adequate consideration to the 
appellant. However, the burden of showing the respondent's 
failure to give adequate consideration is the affirmative 
burden of the appellant where, as here, the appellant stipulated 
at trial to the prima facie case of the respondent. General 
Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
To the foregoing principle, (that the respondent 
must give adequate'consideration, with proof of her failure 
to do so being the burden of the appellant) the respondent 
adds the following two general points: 
The first point is stated in 17 Arn Jur 2d, 
Contracts § 102: 
It is fundamental that adult persons suffering 
from no disabilities have complete freedom of 
contract, and ordinarily the courts will not 
inquire into the adequacy of the consideration 
for their contracts •.•. The legal sufficiency 
of a consideration for a promise does not 
depend upon the comparative economic value 
of the consideration and of what is promised 
in return. In other words, the relative 
values of a promise and the consideration 
for it do not affect the sufficiency of the 
consideration and whatever consideration a 
promiser assents to as the price of his promise 
is legally sufficient. 
-5-
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The second point is stated in Jackson v. 
Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d Bl, 415 P. 2d 667 (1966) 
which is a leading case dealing with contracts 
and so called "good will": 
This court has consistantly held in this type 
of a case it reviews questions of facts most 
favorable to the findings of the trial court, 
and traverses only if the evidence or lack of 
it renders it clearly necessary to do so. 
Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at 672. 
Following all of the foregoing principles, the 
trial court correctly declined to substitute its judgment 
for the consideration bargined for by the parties. The 
court further correctly granted judgment to the plaintiff-
respondent on the record herein which shows that the defend< 
appellant stipulated that the plaintiff-respondent had 
established her prima facie case; which record also shows, 
after the defendant's case was completed, that the plaintifi 
had transferred to the defendant a continuing business in 
its entirety. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO RULE THAT 
THE SALE OF A CONTINUING BUSINESS, 
IN ITS ENTIRETY, CONSTITUTES LACK 
OF CONSIDERATION. 
The Court correctly ruled that the case law cited 
by the appellant is not pursuasive on the record that the 
sale by the respondent of a continuing business, in its 
entirety, which had been previously established as a sole 
propri tership under an assumed name, which was transferred 
f h 1 · · ff· · t to stand as considerat: as part o t e sa e, is insu ic1en 
for the transaction between the parties. 
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We refer specifically to the Utah cases of 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d Bl, 415 P.2d 667 (1966) 
and Vercimak v. Ostoich, llU Utah 253, 221 P.2d 602 (1950), 
which are generally consistant with case law from other 
jurisdictions on this subject. Like many other cases, these 
involve disputes rising out of the dissolution of professional 
partnerships which are held in Utah to have no independent 
good will. Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at Page 670. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Jackson v. Caldwell 
noted that "good will" as it is variously defined, (1) is 
property, (2) can be bargained and sold, and (3) cannot be 
sold separately from property rights to which it is an 
incident. Jackson v. Caldwell, supra at Page 670. 
In the present case the Court was correct in its 
handling of the legal issues relating to good will as the 
same have been stated in Jackson v. Caldwell, supra. The 
Court was correct because the respondent sold her business 
in its entirety to the appellant and she ceased engaging in 
that business herself. Thus, all things whether tangable or 
intangable to which the good will in L. D.'s Fine Foods had 
attached passed totally to the appellant. 
The language from Jackson v. Caldwell, supra, that 
good will cannot be disposed of separately from property 
rights to which it is an incident, is footnoted to the 
Alabama case of Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So.2d 240 
(Alabama 1940). The relevant quotation in Yost v. Patrick 
is a quotation from 38 C.J.S. "Good Will." 
-7-
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Examining the article on good will in Title 
38 C .J .S. reveals the following at Section 8 thereof under 
the title "Sale in Connection with Property to Which Incidec 
Good will, being always incident to some particu;, 
place, name, property, or business to which it · 
inseparably adhears, can be sold, assigned, or 
otherwise transferred only in connection with a 
transfer o~ the thing to which it is incident, see 
supra Section 3. 
If the property, business, or right to which a 
good will adhears is sold or otherwise transfem: 
the good will, although not specifically menti~~ 
passes to the transferree as an incident theu~. 
(emphasis added) 
That good will must pass together with the propert 
business, or the right to which it adhears, appears to be a 
well settled requirement. The appellant's position that 
good will can only be transferred when it is attached ~ 
some form of tangible property, is not correct. Good will 
may just as well apply to a business or a right which are 
not themselves tangible. 
In the present case, the Court was correct in its vie•· 
that the plaintiff-respondent had effectively transferr~~ 
the defendant-appellant the fruits of her work and enterpr:' 
which together with the training that she supplied and the 
good will she had developed constitutes sufficient consi~0 
This court properly should view the facts in the 
record in a manner most favorable to the findings of t~ 
trial court and whereas here, the defendant-appellant faile 
to establish his affirmative defense of lack of considerat: 
either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, the ruJ:' 
-8-
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of the trial court should be upheld. 
SUMMARY 
The Trial Court held, and the record clearly shows, 
that the plaintiff-respondent gave legally sufficient con-
sideration to the defendant-appellant in exchange for 
$7,500.00. The burden was on the defendant to show the 
insufficiency of consideration, which burden was not met. 
The Trial Court found all factual and legal issues in favor 
of the plaintiff-respondent and that judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this _t:;_~ of June, 
1978. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered ___d::__ copies of 
the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Richard D. Bradford, 
359 West Center Street, Provo, Utah, on this !5jj} day of 
June, 1978. 
ALAN RUDD 
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